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Abstract
The conceptual relation between the measurability of quantum mechanical
observables and the computability of numerical functions is re-examined. A
new formulation is given for the notion of measurability with finite precision
in order to reconcile the conflict alleged by M. A. Nielsen [Phys. Rev. Lett.
79, 2915 (1997)] that the measurability of a certain observable contradicts
the Church-Turing thesis. It is argued that any function computable by a
quantum algorithm is a recursive function obeying the Church-Turing thesis,
whereas any observable can be measured in principle.
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In the theory of quantum computing [1,2], the process of computation consists of the
preparation of the computing machine, the unitary evolution, and the measurement so that
the mathematical notion of computation is intrinsically related to the notion of measurement
in quantum mechanics. Since the Church-Turing thesis [3,4] defines the notion of computable
functions independent of the notion of measurement of quantum mechanical observables, it
is an interesting problem to examine whether or not those two notions lead to a conflict.
Recently, Nielsen [5] argued that the measurability of a certain quantum mechanical observ-
able, called the halting observable, leads to the computability of a noncomputable function
and concluded that either the Church-Turing thesis needs revision or that only a restricted
class of observables may be realized, in principle, as measurements. The purpose of this
Letter is to re-examine Nielsen’s argument and to establish a precise conceptual relation
between the measurability of observables and the computability of functions.
It can be pointed out that Nielsen’s formulation of the measurability of observables does
not respect sufficiently the fact that every measuring apparatus has only finite precision as
long as it can be constructed in a laboratory or it is finitely realizable. A new formulation will
be given for the measurability with finite precision from this point of view. The measurability
of an observable is defined naturally based on this concept. Under this formulation, it is
proved that the halting observable is measurable, contrary to Nielsen’s argument, without
any contradiction with the Church-Turing thesis. Thus, Nielsen’s argument is not acceptable.
It will be also argued that any function computable by a quantum algorithm is a computable
function obeying the Church-Turing thesis from a proof theoretical point of view due to
Church [3].
Using a noncomputable function h(x), called the halting function [6], Nielsen has defined
the halting observable hˆ by
hˆ =
∞∑
x=0
h(x)|x〉〈x|, (1)
where {|x〉 | x = 0, 1, . . .} is an orthonormal basis for the state space of some physical
system. It is assumed that all the states |x〉 may be prepared, in principle.
His argument runs as follows. Suppose that it is possible to construct a measuring device
to measure the observable hˆ. Then one performs the following procedure: Construct the
measuring apparatus to measure hˆ, prepare the system in the state |x〉, and perform the
measurement. With probability one the outcome of the measurement will be h(x). This
gives a procedure for computing the halting function. If one accept the Church-Turing thesis,
this is not an acceptable conclusion, since the halting function is not computable.
Nielsen rephrases the measurability of an observable by the existence of a realizable
measurement. However, every realizable measurement is limited with a finite precision and
hence the correspondence between observables and measurements are not one-to-one; an
observable can be measured with various precisions and a measuring apparatus measures
many observables in a given error limit. It follows that the notion of measurability should
respect correctly the fact that every realizable measurement has a finite precision.
We define the measurability of an observable as follows [7].
Suppose that a measuring apparatus operates on a system in states |ψi〉 with i = 1, . . . , N
where N is an arbitrary finite integer and let ai be the experimentally determined average
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value of the outcomes of the apparatus in the state |ψi〉 with the error ǫi. We say that this
measuring apparatus measures an observable A (with its own error limit) if
|〈ψi|A|ψi〉 − ai| < ǫi (2)
for all i = 1, . . . , N . If such a measuring apparatus exists, the observable A is said to be
measurable with precision {(|ψi〉, ǫi)| i = 1, . . . , N}. If this is the case for arbitrarily given
{(|ψi〉, ǫi)| i = 1, . . . , N}, the observable A is said to be measurable. Here, we assume that
all |ψi〉 are chosen from the domain of A.
Now, according to the above definition, we have the following
Theorem: Let A1, A2, . . . be a sequence of bounded measurable observables. If an
observable A is the limit of A1, A2, . . . in the sense that we have
lim
n→∞
〈ψ|An|ψ〉 = 〈ψ|A|ψ〉 (3)
for all states |ψ〉 in the domain of A, then A is measurable [9].
The proof runs as follows. For all i = 1, . . . , N , let |ψi〉 be an arbitrary state in the
domain of A, let ǫi be an arbitrary positive number. From (3) there is a number ν such that
|〈ψi|Aν |ψi〉 − 〈ψi|A|ψi〉| < ǫi
2
(4)
for all i = 1, . . . , N . Since Aν is measurable, there exists a measuring apparatus with the
average outcomes ai and the errors ǫi/2 in the states |ψi〉 satisfying
|〈ψi|Aν |ψi〉 − ai| < ǫi
2
. (5)
From (4) and (5) we have
|〈ψi|A|ψi〉 − ai| < ǫi. (6)
It follows that the above measuring apparatus measures A with precision {(|ψi〉, ǫi)| i =
1, . . . , N}. Since this precision is arbitrarily given, we conclude that A is measurable.
Note that an observable on a finite dimensional state space may have a measuring appa-
ratus with absolute precision if it is measurable, but it is not the case in general.
In order to prove the measurability of the halting observable, we shall first note that
there is no conflict between the computability of functions essentially defined on a finite set
and the measurability of corresponding observables.
For any natural number n the truncated function hn is defined by
hn(x) ≡
{
h(x) if x < n;
0 if x ≥ n. (7)
Every integer-valued function defined on a finite set is computable, and hence the function
hn is computable, since its computation consists of the decision of the inequality x < n and
computing the function h(x) restricted to the finite set {0, . . . , n − 1}. Thus, every hn is
computable. Note that limn→∞ hn(x) = h(x) whereas h is not computable; the limit of a
sequence of computable functions is not necessarily computable.
3
The corresponding truncated observable hˆn is given by
hˆn =
n−1∑
x=0
h(x)|x〉〈x|. (8)
We can show the measurability of hˆn as follows. For any positive integer n, define an
observable Nˆn by
Nˆn =
n−1∑
x=0
x|x〉〈x|. (9)
Since it is assumed that every state |x〉 may be prepared, we can take it for granted that
every observable |x〉〈x| can be measured with arbitrary precision; otherwise, we cannot
know that the state |x〉 can be prepared. It follows that finitely many observables |x〉〈x|
with x = 0, . . . , n − 1 can be measured simultaneously with arbitrary precision, and hence
we can conclude that the observable Nˆn is measurable.
In order to measure hˆn, we need only to measure Nˆn first and to send the outcome to a
computing machine to compute the function hn. Thus, the observable hˆn is measurable.
In order to show the measurability of hˆ, it suffices to show that for any state |ψ〉 in the
domain of hˆ we have
lim
n→∞
〈ψ|hˆn|ψ〉 = 〈ψ|hˆ|ψ〉. (10)
By expanding |ψ〉 = ∑∞
x=0
cx|x〉, we have
|〈ψ|hˆ|ψ〉 − 〈ψ|hˆn|ψ〉| ≤
∞∑
x=n
|cx|2 → 0 (11)
as n → ∞ and hence (10) follows. Thus, we conclude that the halting observable hˆ is
measurable.
Nielsen’s argument intrinsically concludes that there is no single measuring apparatus
which measures hˆ with absolute precision under the Church-Turing thesis. However, this
conclusion is not surprising because almost every observable of infinite rank has no single
measuring apparatus to measure it with absolute precision.
In order to prepare for this point, Nielsen also gave another argument which takes ap-
proximate measurements into account. His second argument runs as follows. Suppose that
it is possible to measure an observable hˆ′ which is close to hˆ. Preparing the system in the
state |x〉 and measuring hˆ′, a result in the range h(x) ± δ is obtained with probability at
least 1− ǫ, for some small ǫ and δ. Clearly, by performing measurements of this type many
times it is possible to determine h(x) with arbitrary high confidence. Thus, approximate
measurements of hˆ give an algorithmic means for computing h(x).
In Nielsen’s second argument, it is assumed that ǫ and δ do not depend on x. However,
if δ were dependent on x and if δ = δ(x) were not bounded in x, we could not conclude
that the repetition of measurements of that type can determine h(x). In most cases, a
measuring apparatus realizable in the laboratory is a device for approximate measurement
for which the measurement accuracy is dependent on and unbounded in the input states, so
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that the noise can be specified well only for the finite number of input states as formulated
by (2). Hence the repeated use of that device cannot determine the true values for all input
states |x〉. Thus, Nielsen’s second argument excludes more common type of approximate
measurements.
In general, in order to approach the precise measurement of a given observable we need to
use an infinite sequence of measuring apparatuses with more and more stringent precisions.
Only if there is an algorithmic mean to produce the sequence of (mathematical models
of) such measurements, the sequence of measurements with finite precision can incorporate
with the quantum computation. For instance, the sequence of precise measurements of hˆn
approaches the precise measurement of hˆ, but there is no algorithmic mean to produce the
sequence hˆn; otherwise the halting function h could be computable. Thus, even the infinite
sequence of precise measurements of hˆn does not serve as an algorithmic mean for computing
h(x).
The difference between measurability and computability can be illustrated more clearly
by measurements of physical constants where no essential distinction between quantum and
classical measurements takes place. Physical constants can be regarded, if the unit system
is fixed, as an observable of the simplest type such that every state is its eigenstate.
Every rational numbers can be represented as a ratio of two integers so that it can be
measured with absolute precision by a finitary method. A real number is defined to be
a Cauchy sequence of rational numbers a1, a2, . . .. Since every an can be measured with
absolute precision, it follows from Theorem that every real number is measurable.
On the other hand, a real number is computable if and only if the function n 7→ an from a
natural number n to the rational number an is computable, where {an} is a Cauchy sequence
of rational numbers representing a. That is, every Cauchy sequence corresponds to a real
number and every computable Cauchy sequence corresponds to a computable real number.
Some irrational numbers such as
√
2, π, and e have algorithms for producing sequences of
irrational numbers converging them and hence they are computable [10].
Is the value of the Planck constant in the standard unit system computable? We know
no algorithm to compute the Planck constant and we do not believe in such an algorithm. In
fact, the cardinality of the set of computable numbers is countable infinite and has Lebesgue
measure 0, so that an arbitrarily given real number from an interval is computable with
probability 0. Thus, the Planck constant is measurable but almost surely not computable,
since the given unit system is defined rather arbitrarily based on the circumference of the
earth, for example.
According to the Church-Turing thesis, the computability is defined through comput-
ing machines which obey classical mechanics. Hence, it might be thought that quantum
mechanical computing can circumvent the Church-Turing thesis.
Deutsch [1] discussed this problem and concluded that the class of functions computable
by quantum Turing machines is the class of recursive functions. However, his argument
appears to be too restrictive to settle the problem. Since his argument is based on the
equivalence between deterministic quantum Turing machines and reversible Turing machines
[12], his argument excludes the probabilistic quantum algorithms such as Monte Carlo type
algorithms and Las Vegas type algorithms.
In what follows, we shall argue that every quantum algorithm still does not contradict
the Church-Turing thesis.
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It is obvious that every recursive function is considered to be computable. Church [3]
explained two reasons why the converse can be considered to be true. The first one of them
cannot apply directly to quantum computing, since it assumes that every algorithm should
be represented by a sequence of expressions. However, the second one is more general and
runs as follows.
A function y = f(x) of the natural numbers is said to be representable in a formal
system including the arithmetic, if there is a formula φ(x, y) in that system such that for
any natural numbersm,n and the symbols µ, ν in that system representing m,n respectively,
ifm = f(n) then the formula φ(µ, ν) is provable and ifm 6= f(n) then the negation of φ(µ, ν)
is provable. Then, it is well-known that if the system is consistent, the class of representable
functions coincides with the class of recursive functions. Church mentioned this fact as one
of two grounds of his thesis. Although the Church-Turing thesis does not define the notion
of algorithm explicitly, the above fact suggests implicitly a condition that every algorithm
should satisfy.
It is plausible that any quantum algorithm Q is associated with a mathematical proof
to justify that Q computes some function f . Since a quantum algorithm depends on the
theory of Hilbert spaces and operators, the proof may use theorems in much wider fields
than pure arithmetic, but they can be formalized in the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with
the axiom of choice (ZFC), an axiomatic foundation of the current mathematics. Then, we
require that any quantum algorithm can be expressed by a numeralwise provable formula
in the following sense: By the formalization of the quantum algorithm Q and its proof
in ZFC we can construct a formula φ(x, y) in ZFC such that if m = f(n) then φ(µ, ν) is
provable and if m 6= f(n) then the negation of φ(µ, ν) is provable [13]. If this is the case, the
function f is representable by φ(x, y) in ZFC so that f is a recursive function. Thus, we can
conclude that every function f computable by a quantum algorithm is a recursive function.
Nielsen’s procedure is proved to compute the halting function h, but the procedure cannot
be expressed by a numeralwise provable formula, since h is not representable unless ZFC is
inconsistent. Hence, Nielsen’s procedure cannot be considered as a quantum algorithm [14].
Currently, quantum algorithms are represented by quantum Turing machines [15,1,16] or
quantum circuit families [17,18]. Since a quantum Turing machine has a tape with infinite
length, it cannot be considered as a finitely realizable physical system, but as an infinite
sequence of finitely realizable physical systems.
For a computing process using a quantum Turing machine to be a quantum algorithm,
it is necessary that the quantum transition function, or the matrix elements of the time
evolution unitary operator in the computational basis, has values in the computable complex
numbers. In this case, every function computable by a quantum Turing machine is a recursive
function.
On the other hand, quantum circuits have only a finite dimensional state space, and
hence a quantum algorithm to compute a numerical function with arbitrarily large inputs
is represented by a family {Qn} of quantum circuits of the arbitrary input length n. The
computing performed by a quantum circuit family is a quantum algorithm if and only if the
matrix elements 〈x|Un|x′〉 in the computational basis of the unitary operator Un representing
each quantum circuit Qn are computable complex numbers computable in x, x′, n. Such a
quantum circuit family is called a uniform quantum circuit family [20]. In this case, it
can be concluded that every function computable by a uniform quantum circuit family is a
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recursive function. Shor’s algorithms for discrete logarithm and factorization are considered
to be represented by uniform quantum circuit families [19].
Computer science treats two levels of computability: the computability defined by the
Church-Turing thesis and the efficient computability formalized in the computational com-
plexity theory. Accordingly, the physics of computing has the following four levels of reality
of the physical entities.
(1) Experimental reality represented by finitely realizable objects such as rational num-
bers, finite dimensional rational matrices, and measuring devices.
(2) Efficiently computable reality represented by a polynomial time computable sequence
of finitely realizable objects such as polynomial time computable real numbers, discrete
Fourier transforms, and Shor’s algorithm.
(3) Computational reality represented by a constructive sequence of finitely realizable
objects such as computable real numbers, quantum Turing machines, uniform quantum
circuit families.
(4) Mathematical reality represented by a Cauchy sequence of finitely realizable objects
such as real numbers, observables, and states.
Mathematics represents infinity by a finite length formula with a finitarily decidable
grammar, because of the limitation of our ability of reading the formula. Physics has the
same footing as mathematics in the experimental level by the limitation of our ability of
reading the scale of the meter. Thus, physics also represents infinity by a finite length
mathematical formula. According to this constraint, any computation of an infinite function
and any observable of infinite rank have no experimental reality and need a help from the
rules of the language. This justifies our requirement that a quantum algorithm can be
expressed by a numeralwise provable formula in a formal language. From this, we have shown
that any function computable by a quantum algorithm is a recursive function, whereas any
observable is measurable [21].
I thank Horace Yuen for stimulating discussions on this paper.
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